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Educational integration of children with migration background is an impor-
tant issue in the social sciences. Few studies exist that quantify the disadvan-
tage of immigrant children in education and there has not been any attempt
to identify institutional conditions of the education system that contribute
to educational integration. Using data from ﬁve international student assess-
ments, this study tries to ﬁll that gap. First, Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions
are used to allow for a comparison of (dis)integration of students with migra-
tion background across countries and time. In a second step, (dis)integration
is related to institutional characteristics of the schooling system. The study
shows that early education, time in school and central exams further inte-
gration, while social segregation of students among schools is detrimental to
educational integration.
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Educational integration is an important precondition for the economic assimilation of
immigrants in the host societies. Analyses of international student assessment studies
cause concern about the integration of immigrant children in schools. In the OECD-
countries, two international student assessments (Pisa and Timss) show that students
who were born abroad perform signiﬁcantly worse in the achievement tests, compared
to native students. The mean achievement gap amounts to about 25 test scores in
mathematics and even 28 in science (25% and 28% of the standard deviation in test
scores).
There are several studies investigating the achievement gaps in more detail. For ex-
ample, Entorf and Minoiu (2005) have shown that not only the Pisa achievement gaps
between migrants and non-migrants vary substantially across some OECD-countries, but
also the socio-economic background of the immigrants and its inﬂuence on achievement.
Furthermore, Ammerm¨ uller (2005a) has raised the question, why immigrants in Germany
performed so poorly in Pisa. The answer is twofold: immigrants in Germany come from
less favorable social backgrounds and they get lower returns to their characteristics than
German natives.
Why is there such a wide gap in cognitive skills between students with foreign back-
ground and native students? Can this gap be explained by diﬀerences in student charac-
teristics? What is the role of the educational system, how should schooling be organized
to further the integration of children with foreign background?
This essay is aimed at quantifying the disadvantage of immigrant children in education
and relating it to institutional conditions of the education system. In the ﬁrst step, ed-
ucational (dis)integration of immigrants and second-generation immigrants is measured
and made comparable across countries and time. In the second step, I estimate the
eﬀects of certain characteristics of the education system, such as pre-primary education,
segregation of students among schools or the length of the school year on the integration
of foreign students based on a cross-country time-series analysis.
2 The disadvantage of immigrants
The raw data of various achievement tests give a substantial drawback for students with
migration background. These achievement gaps cannot be directly compared across
countries. Educational success is largely determined by the social background of the
students, like the education of parents and the learning climate at home (cf. Hanushek
and Luque, 2003, W¨ oßmann, 2005a). Moreover, diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent im-
1migrant populations. Depending on the income situation, the geographic region, the
immigration policy and many other characteristics, they attract migrants with diﬀerent
abilities and social backgrounds.
To obtain a reliable indicator for the disadvantage of students with foreign background,
the raw achievement gaps have to be made comparable across countries and time. I use
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to construct such a measure of disintegration (cf.
Blinder, 1973, Oaxaca, 1973). The achievement gaps between native and immigrant
students are decomposed into a part that is explained by diﬀerences in productivity
characteristics and a part that remains unexplained. Educational production functions
are estimated separately for natives, immigrants and second-generation immigrants.2
The average native, immigrant and second-generation immigrant test scores (Y n,Y i,Y s)
can then be written as products of the estimated coeﬃcients (ˆ βn, ˆ βi, ˆ βs) and the average
endowments (Xn,Xi,Xs) of the three groups:
Y n = ˆ βnXn, Y i = ˆ βiXi and Y s = ˆ βsXs. (1)
The average achievement diﬀerentials between native students and students with for-
eign background can be formulated as
∆Y n−i = ˆ βnXn − ˆ βiXi = ˆ βn(Xn − Xi)
| {z }
explained




∆Y n−s = ˆ βnXn − ˆ βsXs = ˆ βn(Xn − Xs)
| {z }
explained




The explained part of the test score gap considers that students with foreign back-
ground may be endowed with less favorable socio-economic characteristics, compared
to native students, and therefore less successful in education. The unexplained part of
the achievement gap can be interpreted as a measure of disintegration. It shows, by
how much students with a migration background would perform better, given their own
endowments, if they had the same returns as native students.
The separate estimation of the educational production function for the three groups
allows the returns to individual characteristics to diﬀer for natives and students with
migration background. It is plausible to assume that natives and foreign students are
diﬀerent populations and obtain diﬀerent returns to their endowments. A high educa-
2The analysis is done separately for immigrants (born abroad) and second-generation immigrants
(one or both parents born abroad). I do not distinguish between second-generation immigrants whose
both parents were born abroad and those who live in interethnic families. In this context, Meng and
Gregory (2005) have shown that a marriage with a native spouse is a vehicle for immigrants to assimilate
economically.
2tional attainment of parents, for example, might not have the same positive impact for
migrated students as for natives.3
The unexplained diﬀerential is interesting to analyze and compare across countries,
nevertheless problematic for the purpose of this paper. The identiﬁcation of institutional
eﬀects needs a measure of integration that is comparable across countries and does not
depend on the average characteristics of immigrant students in a certain country. The
question, the measure should be able to answer, is the following: How much better would
a representative student with foreign background perform in a given institutional regime
if he or she had the same returns as the native students in that regime?
The unexplained diﬀerentials of the above equations are, therefore, standardized to
obtain a comparable measure of disintegration:
Di = X
st
i (ˆ βn − ˆ βi) and Ds = X
st





s are vectors of mean characteristics of immigrants and second-
generation immigrants in the whole sample.
Note that the measure of disintegration is a relative one. It gives the drawback of
students with migration background, relative to the native students in that country.
This is exactly the measure I need to represent the situation of immigrants. It is not
important, whether immigrants in the USA are better than German natives or the
average native in the sample. The only important question is the relative position of
immigrant students in the host society, the place where they are going to live and work.
A typical educational production function includes the students’ family background
characteristics, school resources and institutional features of the education system as
explanatory variables, whereat the family background is seen to insert the most impor-
tant inﬂuence (e.g. Hanushek and Luque, 2003, W¨ oßmann, 2005a). I do not include
school and institutional features in the achievement regressions. School resources are
not randomly allocated across schools, just as little as students with migration back-
ground are. The allocation of school resources is seen as a potential source of integration
policy and controlling for school characteristics in the educational production functions
would underestimate the true level of disintegration. Institutional features are excluded
because these factors are of main policy interest and their inﬂuence will be explored in
the second part of this paper.
3Similarly, studies on the returns to education on the labor market show that individuals with mi-
gration background get a signiﬁcantly smaller payoﬀ to their education (cf. Chiswick and Miller, 2005,
Hartog and Zorlu, 2005).
32.1 Data from Pisa and Timss
I use data from several waves of two diﬀerent international student assessment studies.
The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (Timss) has been conducted
by the IEA (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement)
in 1995, 1999 and 2003 in about 50 diﬀerent countries and the Program for International
Student Assessment (Pisa) has been organized by the OECD in 2000 and 2003. In both
surveys about 4,000 students from about 170 schools were assessed in each participating
country in each wave. Among other things, the surveys provide estimates of student
proﬁciencies in mathematics and science, as well as detailed background information of
students and schools.
After excluding some country-years due to a lack of observations and background
information, the sample consists of 167 country-years which span a time period of 9
years (from 1994 to 2003). See table 1 for a list of the countries. For each of these
167 country-years, I estimate the disintegration of immigrants and second-generation
immigrants (Di,Ds). The dependent variable in the underlying educational production
function is the student test score in Pisa and Timss, respectively and individual student
characteristics are age, grade, sex, the highest obtained education level of parents, the
number of books at home, whether students have a computer, a calculator, an own desk
to study at home and whether they speak the national language at home. Table 2 gives
summary statistics and a description of the student-level variables.4
This rich list of explanatory variables represents the individual characteristics of the
students and their family background. Some more variables concerning the immigration
status, like the reasons why the families migrated, the number of years since immigration
and the home countries of the immigrants can, unfortunately, not be observed in all data-
sets. A variable that is seen to play an important role for the economic assimilation of
immigrants is, whether the students speak the national language at home. This variable
is available in the data and included in the achievement regressions.
Some unobserved ability diﬀerences between natives and immigrants may exist, leading
to an up- or downward bias in the measure of disintegration. However, the used variables
should proxy the ability of the students well. In particular, the education of parents,
the number of books and the language spoken at home are seen as powerful proxies for
student abilities.
The achievement functions are estimated with survey regression techniques, taking
into account that the students are not a random sample but the result of the stratiﬁed
4For some students not all explanatory variables are available. Due to the possibility of non-random
missing values, these observations are not ignored but missing dummies are included in the educational
production functions.
4survey designs of Pisa and Timss. Students are weighted according to the inverse of their
probabilities of being sampled and the possible dependence of standard errors within
clusters (schools) is taken into account. Part of the diﬀerence in the study designs
between Pisa and Timss can thereby be eliminated.
Overall, Pisa and Timss are of similar type. Both are aimed at obtaining an inter-
nationally comparable measure of the proﬁciency level of secondary education students
and both incorporate a comparable quality standard with respect to the design and im-
plementation of the assessment (e.g. sampling procedure, response rates, elaboration of
background and test questions, marking of student answers and the generation of reliable
achievement estimates).5 The similarity of the Pisa and Timss survey designs allows the
use of both studies together.6
Moreover, for the identiﬁcation of institutional eﬀects in the second step, it is important
that each data point provides equally precise information. Following Silber and Weber
(1999), standard errors of the decompositions are computed and their inverse are used as
weights in the second step of the analysis. The standard errors of the decompositions are
obtained by bootstrapping, with 200 bootstrap replications employed. Country-years in
which disintegration is estimated with a lower degree of accuracy are weighted less in
the second step.
2.2 Disintegration in various countries
This section summarizes the actual (non-standardized) results of the Blinder-Oaxaca
decompositions in mathematics and science. Figure 1 shows the total achievement gaps
between natives and foreign students, decomposed into an explained and an unexplained
part. Due to the wide range of diﬀerent countries, these are arranged into seven country
groups, wherefrom mean values are reported.
On average, students with foreign background achieve lower scores than native students
and a positive part of the test score gap can be explained with diﬀerences in student
characteristics in each country group. The total mean gaps range from about 35 science
test points in Africa to about 1 science test point in the Near East. Remember, the test
scores are normally distributed with a (weighted) mean of 500 and a (weighted) standard
deviation of 100 in math and science.
Most country groups exhibit similar gaps in math and science. The European countries
show on average a large achievement gap, 22 points in math and 23 points in science, with
5See OECD (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) and IEA (http://timss.bc.edu/isc/publications.html) for detailed
information on the Pisa and Timss surveys.
6Although the surveys are very similar, some aspects that diﬀer between Pisa and Timss are described
in appendix A. Appendix B deals with the student achievement scores in Pisa and Timss and describes
the applied transformation strategy to reach comparability.
5Figure 1: Achievement gaps in math and science by country groups
about 9% and 20% remaining unexplained. In the country group consisting of Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the United States the mean gaps are much lower and amount
to about 5 math points and 14 science points. In these countries, the mean unexplained
diﬀerential is even negative, which means that foreign students receive higher returns to
their characteristics than natives.
An interesting pattern arises if one compares the disintegration measures with and
without controlling for the national language proﬁciency of students in the achievement
regressions. In the latter case, the unexplained diﬀerentials are substantially larger.
In the European countries 35% and 42% of the gaps remain unexplained if language
at home is not deducted. In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA the mean
unexplained diﬀerentials turn positive and add up to 12% and 75% of the whole gap.
Hence, the proﬁciency of the national language is a major vehicle for migrated students
to catch up in education. This result is an important ﬁnding, since language proﬁciency
6can be inﬂuenced by public policy in diﬀerent ways, like the provision of special language
courses in schools or language trainings for adult migrants.
Most countries in the sample are members of the OECD. Since these countries have
comparable characteristics regarding the economic and social environment, the decom-
position results from these countries are shown separately in ﬁgure 2.
Figure 2: Achievement gaps in math and science in the OECD
In addition to the large variation of achievement gaps and unexplained diﬀerentials,
the graphs tell us two important stories:
• Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, frequently characterized as
traditional countries of immigration, are found in the middle and lower tail of the
gap distribution, whereat in some countries children with migration background
outperform native students. Most of these countries follow a selected immigration
policy, targeted at individuals with high education, professional skills and good
7language proﬁciency (cf. Miller, 1999, Entorf and Minoiu, 2005). The United
States are located in the middle of the gap distribution and have a somewhat dif-
ferent migration population due to its border to Mexico and its large fraction of
family reunions (cf. Entorf and Minoiu, 2005). The total gaps between migrated
students and native Americans amount to 24 math points and 32 science points.
Students with migration background come from families with less favorable char-
acteristics and they get on average higher returns in math and lower returns in
science compared to native Americans.
• Within Europe, the German-speaking countries, the Benelux-countries, France and
the Scandinavian countries can be found in the upper part of the distribution. The
Southern and Eastern European countries as well as England, Ireland and Scotland
are ranked in the lower tail.
As mentioned above, a standardized version of the unexplained diﬀerential is used
as measure of disintegration in the regression analysis of the second part. Table 4
gives summary statistics of the actual and the standardized unexplained diﬀerentials in
mathematics and science. In all cases, immigrants face a higher level of disintegration
than second-generation immigrants. This result was expected, as the assimilation of
immigrants is associated with their length of stay in the host country. Furthermore, for
immigrants, disintegration is larger in science than in math.
The unexplained part of the test score gap can be interpreted as a measure of disin-
tegration, since it tells us how much better students with migration background would
perform if they had the same returns than native students. This measure is not reliable
if unobserved ability diﬀerences between natives and immigrants exist, which are not
covered by the rich list of individual and family background characteristics.
2.3 Unobserved ability diﬀerences?
The immigrants of a given country are a highly selected group of people. Certain factors
motivated their decision to migrate, while others decided to stay in the country. Eco-
nomic models have been developed that investigate the selectivity of economic migrants
with respect to their ability. The most important is the Roy model, applied by Borjas
(1987, 1999) and extended by Chiswick (1999). This human-capital migration model as-
sumes that the rate of return from migration is diﬀerent for high-ability and low-ability
individuals and determines whether an individual decides to migrate. Positive ﬁxed costs
of migration lead to a positive selection of migrants, which is intensiﬁed if high-ability in-
dividuals are more eﬃcient in the migration process. Furthermore, economic immigrants
are negatively selected if the wages in the destination, relative to the home country, are
8higher for low-ability individuals. This result implies that, for a constant ability dis-
tribution across countries, a lower relative income inequality in the destination country
negatively selects migrants. In total, due to the costs of migration and the likelihood
that such costs are lower for high-ability individuals, economic migrants are positively
self-selected. The positive selectivity is diminished if the relative income inequality is
higher in the home county.
Economic reasons are not the only ones, why people migrate. Refugees have to move
because their safety or freedom is at risk and other people move to accompany family
members in other countries. Such migrants are mostly not favorably selected, as studies
on unemployment and earnings show (Chiswick, 1999). Furthermore, not only the supply
of immigrants determines the foreign population of a country, but demand side eﬀects
are relevant, too. Some countries follow an immigration policy that is restricted to
well-educated immigrants with good language skills.
Overall, as long as ability and motivation cannot be observed entirely, the estimated
disintegration is likely to be over- or underestimated depending on unobserved ability
diﬀerences. Economic theories predict that in countries with a relatively low level of in-
come inequality and a big part of immigration due to non-economic reasons, immigrants
are likely to be negatively self-selected with respect to their ability. On the contrary, a
selective immigration policy leads to a positive selection of immigrants. Thus, the high
level of disintegration in the European countries, may be overestimated, whereat the
low or even negative level of disintegration in traditional immigration countries may be
underestimated.
3 The role of institutions
Why does educational integration vary so dramatically between diﬀerent countries?
What is the inﬂuence of the education system and what can policy do to further the
integration of students with migration background?
To ﬁnd answers to these questions, I relate the unexplained part of the test score gap
to institutional characteristics of the education system, such as ethnic and social segre-
gation of students among schools, pre-primary education, starting age of schooling, class
size, full-time schooling, external student assessment, costs of education and promotion
activities.
Segregation School systems diﬀer with respect to the segregation of migrants and
poor students among schools. A high degree of ethnic or social segregation is caused
either by selectivity mechanisms of the education system, like general tracking, or by a
high degree of residential segregation in comprehensive education systems. On the one
9hand, immigrants may proﬁt from segregated schools because teachers may be more able
to target the needs of the students in more homogenous classes. On the other hand, a
higher degree of segregation can harm immigrant children because they have a higher
probability of being allocated to low grade school types and schools (e.g. Rees et al.,
1996, Epple et al., 2002). Attending a lower grade school type or a school in a poor
neighborhood can have negative eﬀects for mainly two reasons: school resources might
not be equally allocated to the diﬀerent schools and the absence of clever classmates
and students from supporting homes may have negative eﬀects on the learning climate.
Some empirical studies on peer eﬀects show that low-ability students and students from
less favorable family backgrounds could proﬁt from being placed with high-ability peers
(Winston and Zimmerman, 2003, Sacerdote, 2001, Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer, 2006).
Whether the negative eﬀects of segregation overwhelm the positive ones will be seen.
Pre-primary education Carneiro et al. (2005) have studied labor market discrim-
ination of ethnic minorities in the United States and argue that deﬁcits in cognitive
skills of minorities emerge early and widen with schooling. The authors recommend that
policy measures to increase the labor market success of minority groups should be ap-
plied as early as possible. Early-childhood programs, like kindergartens, day care centers
and pre-schools are aimed at preparing children for primary education and providing an
equal starting point for all children. Currie (2001) investigated pre-school programs in
the United States and found signiﬁcant beneﬁts for educational attainment and earn-
ings, especially for disadvantaged children. In another study, Currie and Thomas (1999)
focused on the impacts of Head Start, a subsidized pre-school program in the US. The au-
thors show that all children beneﬁt from Head Start, compared to their siblings, who did
not attend the program and Head Start closes one quarter of the test score gap between
Hispanic and white children. Head Start has also shown to have signiﬁcant long-term
eﬀects: white children are more likely to complete high school and attend college and
African-Americans are less likely to be involved in criminal activity (Garces et al., 2002).
In total, the evidence on pre-primary education suggests that a country should be more
eﬀective in decreasing inequality between ethnic groups, the more children of immigrants
and second-generation immigrants attend pre-primary education.
Starting age of schooling Whether to enroll children in school at an earlier or
later time has been discussed frequently. Most economic studies in this regard rely on
within-country variation in entry age due to month or quarter of birth (e.g. Angrist
and Krueger, 1992). In this cross-country study a wider range of variation in school
starting age is investigated. It is hypothesized that enrollment at age 7 is detrimental
for immigrant students, since the integration process in school starts later and the eﬀect
10of parental background gets stronger. Attendance at age 5 should operate the other way
around and reduce the drawback of migration.
Pupil-teacher ratio The question, whether class size aﬀects student achievement, has
been studied extensively. In general, only little solid evidence has been found to support
class size reduction policies. Krueger (1998) has found signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of
the pupil-teacher ratio, with higher magnitudes in mathematics than in science. The
investigation of the Tennessee Student-Teacher Achievement Ratio experiment (STAR)
shows that smaller classes in primary education help students, especially low-income
and minority students. The pupil-teacher ratio in primary education, thus, is assumed
to have a negative impact on the integration of foreign students.
Time in school If foreign students spend more time in school, pedagogically sup-
ported, together with kids of other ethnic groups, they should communicate more, learn
the national language and other national habits and integration can take place. Ad-
ditionally, the inﬂuence of the parents on the learning of their children is limited. A
full-time school system should, therefore, lead to a higher degree of integration. On the
other hand, especially for students with learning or language problems, top much time
in school might be too demanding. Aksoy and Link (2000) investigated US panel data
and found mathematics achievement to be positively aﬀected by the number of minutes
per math class. The number of legal days in school and hours of school week show no
consistent eﬀects. Lewis and Seidman (1994) found large positive eﬀects of the length of
school year in a cross-section analysis. In total, it is expected that up to a certain level,
time in school should have positive eﬀects on the integration of children with migration
background.
External student assessment Central examinations restrict the latitude of teachers’
grading practices, provide information on the relative standing of students and schools
and induce parental and public pressure on students, teachers and schools. It is not sur-
prising that central student assessments are positively related to academic achievement.
W¨ oßmann (2005b) has shown that central exams exert heterogenous performance eﬀects
and reduce the achievement drawback of children with migration background. Thus,
external student assessment should increase educational integration.
Costs of schooling Educational costs inﬂuence the decision of accumulating human
capital (Becker, 1964). Higher costs of schooling should reduce educational attainment
and, thus, learning motivation and eﬀort of teenage students, in particular those from
less favorable home environments. Direct costs as well as opportunity costs of school-
ing should decrease the success of integrating ethnic minorities. Following Bauer and
Riphahn (2007), I use the population density as a proxy for direct and the unemployment
rate as an indicator for indirect education costs. It is assumed that a lower population
11density increases the mean distance to school and in turn raises the costs of schooling.
Furthermore, the opportunity costs of education are higher, the more jobs available,
thus, the lower unemployment.
Promotion of students Immigrant children should proﬁt from school systems which
oﬀer special courses in academic subjects for low achieving students. Enrichment activi-
ties for gifted students, on the other hand, may increase the achievement gap. If students
with migration background are less frequently promoted in enrichment courses, such pro-
grams are detrimental to the integration of these children.
3.1 Identiﬁcation of institutional eﬀects
I use pooled weighted least squares and ﬁxed-eﬀects methods to identify institutional
eﬀects on disintegration. The model can be written as
Dct = α0 + α1Ict + α2Yct + α3Cct + vc + uct, (5)
where c and t index countries and time. The dependent variable Dct is the standardized
unexplained diﬀerential of immigrants and second-generation immigrants, respectively.
The vector Ict represents educational institutions, Yct stands for the income situation
of the country and Cct is a vector of control variables. The error term of the model is
split up in a part that is constant within each country vc and an idiosyncratic part uct.
A country ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation is a perfect way to eliminate the country speciﬁc
unobservables vc, like the ability composition of the immigrant population which is not
entirely observed. The main identifying assumption is then reduced to the condition that
foreign students observed in 1994 should not diﬀer from those in 2003 in their unobserved
characteristics within each country.
The problem of a country ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation is that only the variation over time
within the countries is used to estimate the coeﬃcients. With a time span of not even
10 years, it is diﬃcult to rely on time variation only. Institutional characteristics show
little time-variability and the eﬀects of explanatory variables that do not change over
time cannot be estimated. Furthermore, diﬀerencing out country eﬀects may cause
attenuation bias because of measurement errors. Measurement errors might arise in this
study from an imprecise measurement of disintegration, the fact that it is calculated from
diﬀerent student assessment studies and the aggregation of institutional characteristics
to the country-level.
Due to these reasons, three methods are used to estimate the model, pooled WLS,
WLS with country group dummies as listed in table 1 and WLS with country ﬁxed-
eﬀects. Furthermore, to account for major changes in the unobserved characteristics of
12the immigrants over time, I control for changes in the home countries (migration regions)
of the foreign population. For a small number of countries, I have aggregate data on
the home regions of the migrant population stock. Moreover, the model is estimated
for the whole sample and for the subsample of OECD-countries. Though the OECD-
sample is rather small, it includes countries that show comparable characteristics and
the identifying assumptions are more likely satisﬁed.
3.2 Explanatory variables
The empirical analysis of institutions is based on data from diﬀerent sources. First, the
Pisa and Timss databases include useful information on schools, whereat the relevant
school variables are aggregated to the country-level.7 One might ask, why school data
are aggregated to the country-level and their eﬀects on immigrant performance are not
estimated directly. Exploiting the variation among schools entails the problem of student
self-selection. If high-ability immigrants are more likely to choose better schools with
clever peers and adequate equipment, the eﬀects of school resources cannot be identiﬁed.
Aggregation helps to overcome this identiﬁcation problem to the cost of measurement
errors in focusing only on the mean level of resources, regardless of their distribution.
Further data sources are the World Banks’ World Development Indicators 2005, the
UNESCO Institute for Statistics and the Trends in International Migration published
by the OECD. Table 5 gives summary statistics of the country-level variables. Unfor-
tunately, the used data is incomplete. As is explained in detail in appendix C, some
missing values are imputed from other years. Further unavailable data that cannot be
imputed from other years are not dropped from the sample but missing dummies are
included in the regressions.
Segregation of students among schools is measured by the Duncan and Duncan (1955)
dissimilarity index, recently applied by Burgess and Wilson (2003) and Jenkins et al.
(2006). The dissimilarity index of ethnic segregation is based on a binary variable that

















where fs and ns are the numbers of foreign and native students in school s and F
and N are the total numbers of foreign and native students in the country. The index
7Because Pisa and Timss do not provide representative samples of schools in a country, the aggregation
is based on weighted schools, whereat the weight for a school is simply the sum of all student weights
within this school. Since the student sample is representative for the total student population, weighted
school aggregates are good proxies for the school population.
13ranges from 0 to 1 and gives the fraction of students with migration background that
has to be moved to other schools to ensure an equal representation of foreign students in
each school. Analogously, a social segregation index is calculated, where the two groups
represent students with more and less than 25 books at home.8
A measure of pre-primary education is the percentage of students enrolled in pre-
primary education (from all eligible students). Enrollment rates by immigration status
are not available, thus, it is assumed that higher total enrollment rates can be associated
with higher enrollment rates of minorities, too. Chiswick and DebBurman (2005) have
shown that immigration status, next to socio-economic background, education and family
size positively aﬀects pre-primary enrollment. The variable is used in a lagged form and
matches the years where the children were 4 to 5 years old.
The starting age of schooling ranges from 5 to 7, whereat in most countries the students
enter primary education at age 6. The pupil-teacher ratio in primary education refers
to the years 1988 to 1996, the period when the children of the sample were 7 to 8 years
old. Time in school is represented by the instructional hours per school year. This
information is available for each school that participated in Pisa and Timss and was
aggregated to the country-level. External student assessment is given by the fraction
of schools that does not have the primary responsibility for student assessment policies.
The costs of schooling are measured by the population density and the unemployment
rate of youth. Promotion of students is given by the fraction of schools that oﬀers, on
the one hand, enrichment courses in mathematics and science for gifted students and,
on the other hand, remedial courses for low achieving pupils.
Furthermore, GDP per capita and the Gini coeﬃcient represent the income situation
of the country. GDP per capita is an indicator for the general availability of resources
and the Gini coeﬃcient gives a picture of inequality in the labor market. Moreover, high-
income countries with a lower degree of income inequality may suﬀer from negatively
self-selected economic migrants. Unfortunately, there is no time variation in the Gini
coeﬃcient in the available data. It is assumed that income inequality has not changed
substantially within the analyzed time period and the Gini coeﬃcient is taken as ﬁxed
for each country.
The Trends in International Migration provides information on migration regions for
a small number of country-years. Thus, I have the information on where the foreign
population comes from. This information is used to account for the possibility that
unobserved characteristics of the foreign population change over time.
8The segregation indices diﬀer between Pisa and Timss. While Pisa sampled single students from
schools, Timss assessed whole classes. Thus, the Pisa data refer to school segregation, whereas the Timss
data measure segregation among classes.
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Table 6 gives the estimation results in math and science for all countries. The ﬁrst
two columns of ﬁgures contain the results of the pooled WLS estimations, followed
by the country group ﬁxed-eﬀects and country ﬁxed-eﬀects methods. The regressions
are weighted with the inverse standard error of the underlying decomposition. The
dependent variable is disintegration in math and science of immigrants and second-
generation immigrants, respectively. The eﬀects of income inequality as well as starting
age of schooling cannot be estimated with country ﬁxed-eﬀects because these variables
do not change over time.
4.1 Baseline speciﬁcation
Income situation Pooled WLS as well as country group ﬁxed-eﬀects show that the in-
come situation of the country has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the level of disintegration, at
least in mathematics. This may be due to a resource eﬀect, but also to non-random eco-
nomic migration. The results indicate that high income countries show a higher level of
disintegration. Furthermore, a higher level of income inequality increases disintegration
of foreign students. This result was expected, since migrants often belong to the poor
part of the society and unequally spent resources should aﬀect them negatively. Interest-
ingly, the interactions of GDP and Gini show that foreign students are better integrated
in high-income countries with a higher level of income inequality. The eﬀect may repre-
sent the selectivity of economic migrants. This is exactly what economic theory about
migration predicts. Remember, economic migrants with high abilities are more likely to
migrate to countries where they earn more. Thus, migrants are positively self-selected
in high-income countries with a higher level of income inequality. Unfortunately, the
results on the income situation cannot be checked with country ﬁxed-eﬀects. However,
the aim is the revelation of a selection mechanism, not the inference of a causal relation-
ship. Pooled WLS and WLS with country group eﬀects should, therefore, be suﬃcient
to support the human capital migration model.
Institutions Ethnic segregation of students among schools shows signiﬁcant eﬀects
in some regressions. It seems that the predicted negative eﬀects of segregation (peers
and resources) overwhelm the predicted positive ones (homogenous classes). Students
with migration background proﬁt from schooling systems that do not separate them in
diﬀerent schools or classes, wether by tracking or by residential segregation in compre-
hensive systems. However, the statistical signiﬁcance is rather small and the eﬀect totally
breaks down when diﬀerencing out country eﬀects. The degree of social segregation in
15the school system shows the expected positive sign in all regressions, but the statistical
signiﬁcance is too low to draw any conclusion.9
Enrollment in pre-primary education reduces disintegration in the pooled WLS science
estimation. Most of the other coeﬃcients on pre-primary enrollment show the expected
sign but are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Starting age of schooling is important for educational integration. The pooled WLS
estimations in mathematics and science show that education systems where students
enter at an age of ﬁve can be associated with signiﬁcantly lower levels of disintegration.
Including country group eﬀects reduces the statistical signiﬁcance. On the other hand,
a late entry age of seven is correlated with a higher level of disintegration. However,
the eﬀect is only statistically signiﬁcant in science when diﬀerencing out country group
eﬀects. Countries where children enter primary education at an age of seven, compared
to six, show remarkably higher levels of disintegration in science. The eﬀect amounts to
40% of the standard deviation of the dependent variable and is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1%-level. This result may be due to unobserved country heterogeneity and,
unfortunately, cannot be approved with country ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Time in school is represented by the number of instructional hours per school year
(divided by 100). The variable is also included in a quadratic form to allow for non-
linear returns to school hours. The coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant in almost all
regressions and show the expected eﬀects. According to the country ﬁxed-eﬀects results,
more time in school reduces disintegration up to 1,049 hours in mathematics and up to
1,006 hours in science. Given a mean value of 932 hours per year in the whole sample,
an increase in schooling time would further integration in a number of countries.
Direct schooling costs are important for children with migration background in math,
while the coeﬃcients for science are not statistically signiﬁcant. A higher population
density can be associated with lower direct costs of education and reduces disintegration.
Promotion activities for weak students show some negative eﬀects on disintegration,
but these are only statistically signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst and second speciﬁcation. When
introducing country dummies the statistical signiﬁcance is reduced to 12%. Promotion
of gifted students is detrimental for educational integration if students with migration
background are less likely to be accepted in such courses. This seems to be true in
mathematics, as the country ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation shows.
Mixed and mostly insigniﬁcant results are obtained for the pupil-teacher ratio, external
student assessment and youth unemployment.
9As mentioned above, the Timss observations measure segregation across classes and Pisa refers to
schools. To account for this circumstance, both segregation measures were interacted with a Timss and
a Pisa dummy, but no systematic diﬀerences have been found.
16Control variables The control variable for the Pisa study is mostly statistically sig-
niﬁcant and a quadratic time trend was found in some speciﬁcations.10 As was expected,
second generation immigrants do better than immigrants, both in mathematics and in
science. The gaps between immigrants of the ﬁrst and second generation are of equal
magnitudes in all regressions, about 6 test scores in mathematics and 10 test scores in
science. The coeﬃcients are economically and statistically more signiﬁcant in science.
One reason for this result may be the students’ language proﬁciency. One may assume
that knowledge in science is more inﬂuenced by reading habits compared to knowledge
in mathematics. The reading habits, in turn, should be impaired by insuﬃcient language
skills, from which immigrants do suﬀer more than second-generation immigrants.
4.2 Sensitivity checks
Two kinds of sensitivity checks are implemented. First, the model is estimated for the
subsample of OECD-countries and second, the regions wherefrom the foreign populations
have been migrated are controlled for.
Results for OECD-countries As mentioned above, the identifying assumptions
of the model are more likely satisﬁed if one compares similar countries, only. This is
particularly important for the pooled and country group ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations. The
subset of OECD-countries meets this requirement, since these countries share a number
of economic and social characteristics. Table 7 gives the estimation results.
The income situation gives the same picture as above and shows signiﬁcant eﬀects in
science, too. This result can be interpreted as a selection mechanism. Immigrants and
second-generation immigrants in high-income countries with a higher degreee of income
inequality are better oﬀ. This is consistent with the predictions of economic theory on
the selectivity of economic migrants.
The eﬀect of ethnic segregation on disintegration cannot be approved with the OECD-
sample, but social segregation is statistically more signiﬁcant. All coeﬃcients have the
expected positive sign and the statistical signiﬁcance in science is 10% for the ﬁrst two
estimations and 11% when diﬀerencing out country eﬀects.
The eﬀects of pre-primary education are also statistically and economically more sig-
niﬁcant within the OECD and show an important magnitude even in the country ﬁxed-
eﬀects speciﬁcation. According to this speciﬁcation, an increase in the total enrollment
rate by 25%-points (one standard deviation within the OECD) reduces disintegration by
about 30 math points. That is approximately one standard deviation of the dependent
variable within the OECD.
10The inclusion of dummy variables for the diﬀerent study-waves instead of Pisa and time does not
change the results
17Moreover, the results on school starting age of primary education can be approved.
Migrants perform considerably better if they enter school at an age of 5, compared to 6.
Total hours per school year inﬂuence mathematics proﬁciency. According to the coun-
try ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation, schooling time reduces disintegration up to 1,174 instruc-
tional hours per year. Given a mean of 954 within the OECD, this is an important
message. The magnitude of the eﬀect is sizeable: starting from the mean, an increase of
100 hours (one standard deviation within the OECD) can be associated with a decrease
in disintegration by 6.5 math scores.
While most of the other variables show mixed and insigniﬁcant results, external stu-
dent assessment seems important within the OECD. Disintegration in science is much
smaller if schools are not responsible for assessment policies. The country ﬁxed-eﬀects
speciﬁcation gives a large coeﬃcient which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Overall, when estimating the model with OECD-countries only most eﬀects on institu-
tions that have been obtained for all countries are corroborated and additional insights
for the OECD-countries are won.
Results with migration regions The second sensitivity check is based on a model
that controls for the regions where the immigrants of a given country come from. This
strategy should remove the remaining problem that unobserved country characteristics,
like the composition of the immigrant population, change over time. The information
on migration regions is only available for 65 country-years. As mentioned above, the
other observations are not dropped but a missing dummy is included in the regressions.
The results are given in table 8 and are very similar to those of table 6, where migration
regions are not included.
4.3 How much do institutions explain?
Do institutional characteristics of the education system explain diﬀerences in educational
integration? To answer this question, I ran the pooled weighted least squares regressions
once only with institutional characteristics of the education system and once only with
income variables. The resulting R2 are given in table 9. As one can see, institutions
matter. 21.8% and 18.4% of the overall variation in disintegration can be explained
by institutions in the whole sample and 14.3% and 11.9% can be explained within the
OECD.
185 Summary and policy recommendations
This essay was aimed at quantifying disintegration of immigrants of the ﬁrst and second
generation in secondary schools. Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions show that, on average,
the test score gaps between students with foreign background and native students cannot
be entirely explained with diﬀerences in the students’ productivity characteristics. In
most countries a positive part of the test score gap remains unexplained. As shown in
ﬁgure 2, educational gaps between native and foreign students and the parts that remain
unexplained vary substantially among the OECD-countries.
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, frequently characterized as
traditional countries of immigration, are found in the middle and lower tail of the gap
distribution. The mean achievement gaps amount to 5 points in math and 14 points
in science. In this country group disintegration is negative, which means that students
with foreign background get higher returns to their characteristics than natives. The
achievement gaps in Europe are larger and average out to 22 math scores and 23 science
scores, with 9% and 20% remaining unexplained.
The proﬁciency of the the national language turned out to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
integration. Disintegration is substantially larger if national language is not included
in the achievement regressions. In the traditional countries of immigration, the unex-
plained gaps turn positive and amount to 12% and 75% of the whole gap. In Europe the
unexplained gaps increase to 35% in math and 42% in science. These ﬁndings strongly
argue for public policies that encourage immigrants to learn the national language.
In the second part, I related disintegration of students with migration background to
institutional characteristics of the education system, the income situation of the country
and some control variables. The estimations show signiﬁcant statistical evidence on the
inﬂuence of some institutional characteristics and other variables.
Interestingly, the estimated eﬀects of the income situation show exactly the results
predicted by economic theory of migration: high income countries with a high level of
income inequality should attract immigrants with higher abilities. In fact, educational
integration is higher in high income countries with higher levels of income inequality.
The design of the education system explains a signiﬁcant part of the variation in disin-
tegration, 21.8% in math and 18.4% in science. The study indicates that early education
is very important for children with migration background. While immigrant students
proﬁt from a school starting age of 5, a late entry in primary education is detrimental
to their integration. Moreover, enrollment in pre-primary education decreases disin-
tegration. According to the country ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation, an increase in the total
enrollment rate by 25%-points in the OECD-countries reduces disintegration by about
1930 math points. This result is in line with the studies on Head Start and indicates that
promotion of students with migration background should start as early as possible.
Social segregation of students among schools is detrimental to the integration of im-
migrants in the OECD-countries. A higher degree of social segregation, either due to
general tracking or residential segregation in comprehensive education systems, can be
associated with a higher unexplained test score gap in science.
Furthermore, I strongly recommend an increase in schooling time for a number of
countries. According to the country ﬁxed-eﬀects results, more time in school reduces
disintegration in the OECD-countries up to 1,174 hours. Given a mean value of about
920 hours in Germany and 955 hours in the United States and Canada, an increase in
schooling time would be beneﬁcial for children with migration background.
Central examinations increase the academic achievement of immigrant students. This
is consistent with other studies and may be due to the involved restriction in the latitude
of teachers’ grading practices and information-induced pressure on students, teachers and
schools. In the OECD-countries, the implementation of external student assessments
would decrease educational disintegration substantially. An increase in the fraction of
schools without main responsibility for student assessment by 0.20 can be associated
with a decline in disintegration by about 11 science points.
Overall, the study has shown that the design of the education system is important for
children with migration background. Recent demographic trends in many industrialized
countries indicate that the integration of migrants will be a major challenge in future.
To meet this challenge, policy makers have to regard educational integration as impor-
tant precondition and education policy as a main instrument to further the economic
assimilation of immigrants.
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23A Appendix: Comparability of Pisa and Timss
Although the surveys are very similar, some aspects that diﬀer between Pisa and Timss should
be mentioned. Timss measures the mastery of an internationally agreed curriculum while Pisa
focuses on challenges of every-day life. Thus, the test questions span the same topics, but diﬀer in
their reference to reality. Furthermore, the target population consists of teenagers in secondary
education. Timss covers children in the grade(s) with the highest proportion of 13-year-olds
(typically grade 7 or 8) and Pisa covers 15-year-old students, independent of grade. It is possible
that immigrants of the ﬁrst generation are more likely placed in lower grades, given their age, for
two reasons: they might have started later with schooling and, in countries where grade-repetition
is common practice, they are more likely to repeat a grade than native students. This problem
is taken into account and the student variables age and grade are included in the educational
production functions. In other words, foreign and native students are only compared on the
grade level, anyway.
From the target population, schools were randomly sampled, but whereas in Pisa all eligible
students from that schools (up to a maximal number of 35 students) were assessed, in Timss one
class per grade was randomly chosen and all students from this class were assessed. In addition,
the form of test questions is slightly diﬀerent. While about two thirds of all Timss questions
show a multiple choice character, Pisa uses only 50% of multiple choice questions.
Finally, the item response model diﬀers. As the assessment consists of a set of test questions
with diﬀerent levels of diﬃculty and the students answered diﬀerent questions, the actual scores
are not directly observed, but must be inferred from the observed item responses. For this aggre-
gation, Pisa used a one-parameter item response model and Timss relied on a three-parameter
model. Brown et al. (2005) present a discussion on the inﬂuence of the item-response model
and conclude that the item response model inﬂuences the test score distribution. Nevertheless,
the authors have shown that the Pisa 2000 one-parameter model results match the results of the
Timss 1995 three-parameter model better than the Timss 1995 one-parameter model. The pro-
ﬁciency scores of Timss 1995 have been generated with a one-parameter and a three-parameter
response model and are available to compare.
24B Appendix: Student achievement scores
Timss achievement scores in mathematics and science are directly comparable across the three
diﬀerent waves. In 1995, the Timss team standardized the achievement scores on an international
level, based on weighted student data of nearly all participating countries. The distribution of
all assessed 8th grade students was set to a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. This
was done only for students in grade 8 (not for those in grade 7) because in the repeated Timss
studies in 1999 and 2003 the target population consisted of 8th grade students, only.
The achievement scores in Pisa have been also standardized to a weighted mean of 500 and a
standard deviation of 100 on the basis of the participating OECD-countries. Because of the alter-
nate major subject assessment in each wave, the Pisa achievement scores are directly comparable
across waves in science, but not in mathematics.
The diﬀerent scales (Timss, Pisa 2000 and Pisa 2003) have been standardized by the survey
teams to a weighted mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100, but on the basis of a diﬀerent
group of countries. Pisa focused on OECD-countries primarily, while Timss included a more
heterogeneous country set. A typical OECD-country is likely to perform above average in Timss,
but not in Pisa and the test scores cannot be compared without transformation.
To my advantage, 15 countries participated in both, the Timss wave 2003 and the Pisa wave
2003. Given the very similar design of the surveys, it is assumed that the test score distribution
in Timss should be equal to that in Pisa in these 15 countries. Thus, the Pisa scores of the
common subsample were transformed to the same weighted mean and standard deviation as the
Timss subsample and in science all other Pisa science scores were then just added to the scale.
In mathematics, a second step was necessary. I calculated the score distribution of the Pisa 2003
data for the subsample of countries participating in 2000 and 2003 and applied this distribution
to the Pisa 2000 subsample.
After this transformation procedure, the math and science scales were transformed to a weighted
mean and standard deviation of 500 and 100. Note that the transformation has no inﬂuence on
the ranking of the students and does not change the distance in terms of standard deviations be-
tween any two students. Very similar approaches were used by Hanushek and W¨ oßmann (2005),
Sch¨ utz et al. (2005) and Ammerm¨ uller (2005b). Table 3 shows the correlation coeﬃcients of the
weighted country means of the achievement scores in math and science among the diﬀerent waves
of Pisa and Timss. On average, country means correlate with about 85% in mathematics and
84% in science. The correlations of medians give a similar picture. Interestingly, the correlations
among the diﬀerent Timss waves are higher than those of Pisa and those between the studies.
25C Appendix: Treatment of missing explanatory variables
As mentioned above, the country-level variables show a number of missing values, whereat some
have been imputed from information of other years:
• Enrollment in pre-primary education is needed for the years where the students of the
sample were 4 to 5 years old: 1985/86, 1988/89, 1991, 1992 and 1993. The information is
available for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993 for all countries, thus, the missings values
for the years between 1985 and 1990 are imputed with the information on these years. For
example, the information on 1989 is calculated with the weighted mean of 1985 and 1990.
Furthermore, a few countries show some missing values for single years. These observations
have been imputed with the values of the previous or following year, if available.
• The pupil-teacher ratio and the unemployment rate are not available for a few relevant
years. Therefore, the information is used from the previous or following year, if available.
• Hours per year is not included in the Pisa 2003 data, thus, the Pisa 2000 indicators are
used for those countries that participated in both waves.
• The Timss 1995 (2003) data do not include school information for the Philippines and
South Africa (Netherlands), thus, the information on time in school, external student
assessment and promotion activities for these three countries was taken from Timss 1999.
• The data on migration regions are not available for the years 2002 and 2003 and the years
2000 or 2001 are used instead. Furthermore, some countries show missing values in some
years and, again, the information from the previous or following year is taken.
26D Appendix: Tables
Table 1: List of countries used in the analysis
Country ISO-Code Study-Years
Europe (without Eastern European countries)
Austria AUT t1995, p2000, p2003
Belgium ﬂemish BFL t1995, t1999, p2000, t2003, p2003
Belgium french BFR t1995, p2000, p2003
Switzerland CHE t1995, p2000, p2003
Germany GER t1995, p2000, p2003
Denmark DNK t1995, p2000, p2003
England ENG p2000, t2003, p2003
Spain ESP t1995, p2000, p2003
Finland FIN p2000, p2003
France FRA p2000, p2003
Greece GRC t1995, p2000, p2003
Ireland IRL t1995, p2000, p2003
Iceland ISL t1995, p2000, p2003
Italy ITA t1995, t1999, p2000, t2003, p2003
Luxembourg LUX p2000, p2003
Netherlands NLD t1995, t1999, p2000, t2003, p2003
Portugal PRT t1995, p2000, p2003
Scotland SCO t1995, t2003, p2003
Sweden SWE t1995, p2000, t2003, p2003
Eastern Europe and Russia
Bulgaria BGR t1999, t2003
Czech Republic CZE t1995, t1999, p2003
Estonia EST t2003
Hungary HUN t1995, t1999, t2003, p2003
Lithuania LTU t1995, t2003
Latvia LVA t1995, t1999, p2000, t2003, p2003
Macedonia MKD t1999, t2003
Moldova MDA t1999, t2003
Romania ROM t1995
Russian Federation RUS t1995, t1999, p2000, t2003, p2003
Slovak Republic SVK t1995, t1999, t2003, p2003
Slovenia SVN t1995, t1999, t2003
Serbia YUG t2003, p2003
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA
Australia AUS t1994, t1998, p2000, t2002, p2003
Canada CAN t1995, t1999, p2000, p2003
New Zealand NZL t1994, t1998, p2000, t2002, p2003
United States USA t1995, t1999, p2000, t2003, p2003
continued on next page . . .
27. . . table 1 continued
Country ISO-Code Study-Years
South America and Mexico
Chile CHL t1998, t2002
Colombia COL t1995





Cyprus CYP t1995, t1999, t2003
Iran IRN t1995, t2003
Israel ISR t1995, t1999, p2002, t2003
Jordan JOR t1999, t2003
Kuwait KWT t1995
Lebanon LBN t2003
Saudi Arabia SAU t2003
Turkey TUR t1999, p2003
Far East
Hong Kong HKG t1995, t1999, p2002, t2003, p2003
Indonesia IDN t2003
Macao, China MAC p2003
Malaysia MYS t1998, t2002
Philippines PHL t1995, t1999, t2003
Singapore SGP t1994, t1998, t2002




Morocco MAR t1999, t2003
South Africa ZAF t1995, t1998, t2002
Tunisia TUN t1999, p2003
# Countries = 62
# Country-years = 167
Notes: Due to diﬀerences in their education systems, Flemish and French Belgium as well as
England and Scotland participated separately in Timss and are treated as diﬀerent countries.
Furthermore, the Timss waves 1995, 1999 and 2003 were implemented in the years 1994, 1998
and 2002 in some countries and some countries carried out the Pisa 2000 assessment in 2002.
28Table 2: Student-level variables
Variable Description Mean Stdev
Test score
Math score Transformed plausible value of math proﬁ-
ciency
500 100




Immigrant Student was born in a foreign country 0.082
Second-Generation
Immigrant
Student’s father, mother or both were born in
a foreign country and student was born in the
country
0.132




Age Age of student in years 14.779 1.050
Grade Grade at school 8.480 1.046
Female Student is female 0.509
Number of books at home
Books1 None - 10 books 0.123
Books2 11 - 25 books 0.201
Books3 26 - 100 books 0.276
Books4 101 - 200 books 0.177
Books5 More than 200 books 0.222
Highest education level reached by a parent
Hisced01 No schooling or primary education (Isced 0, 1) 0.122
Hisced2 Lower secondary education (Isced 2) 0.099
Hisced34 Upper secondary education (Isced 3, 4) 0.491
Hisced56 Tertiary education (Isced 5, 6 ) 0.287
Computer Student has a computer at home 0.608
Calculator Student has a calculator at home 0.935
Study desk Student has an own desk to study at home 0.876
National language Student speaks the national language, an-
other national language or a national dialect
at home, most of the time
0.853
# Students in the mathematics sample = 753,282
# Students in the science sample = 753,445
# Country-years = 167
Notes: The means and standard deviations are based on the mathematics sample and weighted
according to the students’ sampling probabilities. The weights are adjusted to ensure an equal
contribution of each country-year.
29Table 3: Correlations among Pisa and Timss achievement scores




Timss 1999 0.97*** 1
(0.96***) (1)
20 obs 29 obs
Timss 2003 0.97*** 0.97*** 1
(0.93***) (0.96***) (1)
21 obs 24 obs 38 obs
Pisa 2000 0.65*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 1
(0.57***) (0.83***) (0.88***) (1)
22 obs 12 obs 13 obs 28 obs
Pisa 2003 0.71*** 0.85*** 0.75*** 0.94*** 1
(0.69***) (0.89***) (0.80***) (0.87***) (1)
25 obs 15 obs 15 obs 26 obs 35 obs
Notes: Correlation coeﬃcients of weighted country means of math scores (science scores).
***, ** and * indicate a statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 4: Actual and standardized unexplained test score diﬀerentials
Mathematics Science
Variable Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Obs
Total:
Disintegration (actual) 2.71 21.82 4.67 22.64 334
Disintegration (standardized) 5.84 32.29 5.45 36.19 334
By ethnicity:
Immigrants (actual) 2.84 26.88 6.34 27.39 167
Second-generation (actual) 2.59 15.24 3.00 16.50 167
Immigrants (standardized) 6.65 36.74 8.97 44.28 167
Second-generation (standardized) 5.02 27.21 1.92 25.34 167
30Table 5: Country-level variables
Variable Description Mean Stdev Obs
Pisa and Timss data
Ethnic segregation Dissimilarity index of foreign students in
schools (immigrants and second-generation
immigrants)
0.386 0.103 167
Social segregation Dissimilarity index of students with less
than 25 books at home in schools
0.339 0.074 167





Fraction of schools that does not have the
primary responsibility for student assess-
ment policies
0.143 0.212 151
Promotion weak (math) Fraction of schools that provides reme-
dial courses in mathematics (academic sub-
jects) for weak students
0.766 0.185 167
Promotion weak (science) Fraction of schools that provides remedial
courses in science (academic subjects) for
weak students
0.518 0.263 104
Promotion gifted (math) Fraction of schools that provides enrich-
ment courses in mathematics (academic
subjects) for gifted students
0.512 0.281 167
Promotion gifted (science) Fraction of schools that provides enrich-
ment courses in science (academic sub-
jects) for gifted students
0.465 0.275 104
World development indicators 2005
GDP GDP per capita (ppp, in constant 2000 in-
ternational $) divided by 100
180.630 101.593 162
Gini Gini coeﬃcient 0.355 0.081 154
Preprimary enrollment Gross percentage of students who are en-
rolled in pre-primary education (lagged:
time when students were 4/5 years old)
63.712 29.810 157
Pupil-teacher ratio Number of pupils per teacher in primary
education (lagged: time when students
were 7/8 years old)
16.738 6.946 141
Population density People per sq km 537.604 2062.43 167
Youth unemployment Unemployed youth as percentage of total
labor force ages 15-24
15.948 8.670 132
UNESCO Institute for statistics
Age primary 5 Starting age of primary education is 5 0.067 165
Age primary 6 Starting age of primary education is 6 0.679 165
Age primary 7 Starting age of primary education is 7 0.254 165
OECD Trends in international migration
Migration regions: Fraction of foreign population coming from . . .
Western Europe . . . Western European countries 19.046 65
Southern Europe . . . Southern European countries 3.456 65
Eastern Europe . . . Eastern European countries 14.481 65
North America . . . North America 8.375 65
South America . . . South America 1.553 65
Africa . . . Africa 7.274 65
Asia . . . Asia 13.500 65
Oceania . . . Oceania 2.986 65
Other . . . other countries 29.330 65
31Table 6: Results for all countries
Dependent variable: Pooled Country-group-eﬀects Country-eﬀects
Disintegration Mathematics Science Mathematics Science Mathematics Science
Control variables
Pisa -7.311 -19.006 -6.953 -14.348 -4.695 -12.803
(4.068)* (5.665)*** (3.849)* (5.638)** (5.303) (8.114)
Time -5.699 -3.873 -4.606 -2.521 1.785 1.100
(1.991)*** (2.307)* (1.908)** (2.049) (3.354) (3.785)
Time sq 0.600 0.431 0.493 0.320 -0.054 0.029
(0.189)*** (0.233)* (0.184)*** (0.209) (0.293) (0.324)
Second generation -6.407 -10.411 -5.523 -9.547 -5.239 -9.337
(3.212)* (3.561)*** (3.189)* (3.494)*** (2.546)** (2.875)***
Income situation
GDP 0.250 0.185 0.144 0.072 0.013 -0.126
(0.060)*** (0.084)** (0.043)*** (0.069) (0.156) (0.181)
Gini 96.847 54.155 39.072 -4.974
(34.322)*** (47.980) (30.002) (37.734)
GDP*Gini -0.651 -0.355 -0.344 -0.073
(0.154)*** (0.224) (0.114)*** (0.174)
Institutions
Ethnic segregation 18.180 25.035 20.925 17.912 -26.231 -18.916
(10.868)* (13.654)* (10.942)* (12.080) (31.584) (35.636)
Social segregation 6.406 27.488 20.129 45.108 41.094 16.806
(19.030) (20.077) (17.932) (19.313)** (43.299) (48.074)
Preprimary enrollment -0.071 -0.171 -0.015 -0.070 -0.373 0.026
(0.090) (0.088)* (0.076) (0.079) (0.226) (0.257)
Age primary 5 -11.280 -11.256 -7.563 -10.086
(5.528)** (3.493)*** (6.239) (6.115)
Age primary 7 2.487 6.281 8.288 14.490
(4.335) (3.964) (5.180) (4.928)***
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.644 1.124 -0.033 0.492 -1.160 -0.825
(0.330)* (0.483)** (0.293) (0.394) (0.603)* (0.681)
Hours per year -19.372 -17.255 -21.564 -19.552 -20.374 -15.928
(6.015)*** (6.436)*** (5.515)*** (4.859)*** (8.115)** (9.439)*
Hours per year sq 0.997 0.964 1.068 1.056 0.971 0.792
(0.292)*** (0.345)*** (0.283)*** (0.273)*** (0.431)** (0.507)
External studass -2.756 -8.529 4.141 -0.107 -2.217 -21.115
(7.299) (8.935) (5.181) (7.633) (16.830) (18.640)
Population density -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.037 -0.008
(0.001)* (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) (0.019)* (0.022)
Youth unemployment 0.026 0.030 0.041 0.052 0.895 0.612
(0.258) (0.295) (0.212) (0.229) (0.473)* (0.549)
Prom weak math/scie -32.899 -10.516 -28.597 -0.337 -22.181 -3.762
(8.352)*** (7.849) (8.386)*** (7.383) (14.278) (16.744)
Prom gifted math/scie 8.776 -4.401 12.420 -5.869 31.424 -8.767
(5.782) (7.515) (5.214)** (5.988) (11.484)*** (14.711)
Constant 79.415 45.456 107.630 73.260 153.458 127.801
(35.675)** (35.000) (35.191)*** (27.979)** (49.963)*** (59.277)**
R2 0.282 0.258 0.345 0.315 0.477 0.457
Adj R2 0.219 0.192 0.287 0.255 0.301 0.274
N 334 334 334 334 334 334
Notes: Weighted least squares, cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (countries), missing dummies
included, ***, ** and * indicate a statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
32Table 7: Results for OECD-countries
Dependent variable: Pooled Country-group-eﬀects Country-eﬀects
Disintegration Mathematics Science Mathematics Science Mathematics Science
Control variables
Pisa -5.943 -19.897 -7.766 -20.700 0.446 -16.037
(7.959) (7.945)** (8.192) (8.143)** (7.177) (10.829)
Time -3.895 -4.272 -3.183 -5.225 -3.534 -3.330
(2.794) (3.531) (2.947) (3.670) (4.469) (4.948)
Time sq 0.362 0.424 0.307 0.457 0.238 0.469
(0.270) (0.314) (0.271) (0.328) (0.388) (0.421)
Second generation 2.315 -3.100 2.370 -3.431 2.245 -3.234
(3.021) (3.632) (3.036) (3.623) (3.346) (3.744)
Income situation
GDP 0.307 0.382 0.280 0.474 -0.139 -0.123
(0.111)** (0.136)*** (0.220) (0.196)** (0.182) (0.212)
Gini 138.612 144.209 93.598 165.546
(71.275)* (74.814)* (190.591) (158.818)
GDP*Gini -0.788 -0.764 -0.677 -1.024
(0.311)** (0.352)** (0.639) (0.580)*
Institutions
Ethnic segregation 20.416 -3.101 21.594 -17.872 15.921 -29.853
(17.251) (15.541) (19.022) (16.613) (43.827) (49.330)
Social segregation 27.473 69.887 12.955 65.452 67.592 93.712
(27.480) (35.207)* (26.519) (35.204)* (50.698) (57.539)
Preprimary enrollment -0.134 -0.263 -0.225 -0.401 -1.193 -0.303
(0.130) (0.135)* (0.129)* (0.120)*** (0.413)*** (0.466)
Age primary 5 -10.895 -11.446 -9.963 -12.401
(5.731)* (5.386)** (7.199) (7.135)*
Age primary 7 9.523 0.246 6.124 2.204
(7.103) (7.332) (7.997) (7.083)
Pupil-teacher ratio -0.002 0.098 -0.065 0.180 0.270 -0.679
(0.386) (0.631) (0.458) (0.681) (1.005) (1.098)
Hours per year -34.060 -6.807 -28.553 -10.770 -34.612 11.785
(12.691)** (13.234) (13.271)** (13.240) (19.721)* (23.916)
Hours per year sq 1.735 0.252 1.434 0.412 1.474 -0.840
(0.677)** (0.721) (0.705)* (0.703) (1.057) (1.314)
External studass 2.420 -17.736 0.220 -16.776 -1.654 -52.709
(9.625) (8.435)** (10.582) (5.951)*** (21.087) (23.284)**
Population density 0.020 0.014 0.016 0.053 0.923 -0.212
(0.017) (0.016) (0.026) (0.027)* (1.090) (1.220)
Youth unemployment -0.161 -0.273 -0.213 -0.085 -0.689 -0.750
(0.213) (0.321) (0.200) (0.290) (0.875) (1.048)
Prom weak math/scie -19.383 6.245 -21.727 -4.992 -30.659 30.528
(14.574) (18.131) (14.815) (18.405) (19.961) (29.603)
Prom gifted math/scie 9.033 -24.305 8.570 -25.323 65.131 -42.971
(8.305) (21.837) (12.393) (21.513) (20.769)*** (29.035)
Constant 123.118 -11.764 125.850 19.625 189.819 66.656
(61.857)* (66.456) (101.463) (89.155) (151.297) (178.525)
R2 0.186 0.222 0.212 0.243 0.368 0.337
Adj R2 0.067 0.109 0.097 0.133 0.153 0.111
N 190 190 190 190 190 190
Notes: Weighted least squares, cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (countries), missing dummies
included, ***, ** and * indicate a statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
33Table 8: Results with migration regions
Dependent variable: Pooled Country-group-eﬀects Country-eﬀects
Disintegration Mathematics Science Mathematics Science Mathematics Science
Control variables
Pisa -6.469 -16.603 -5.396 -11.074 -4.958 -15.478
(4.325) (5.941)*** (4.129) (5.650)* (5.469) (9.315)*
Time -5.549 -4.153 -4.441 -2.231 2.745 3.113
(2.350)** (2.507) (2.287)* (2.101) (4.069) (4.738)
Time sq 0.581 0.445 0.469 0.290 -0.101 -0.080
(0.212)*** (0.246)* (0.201)** (0.208) (0.331) (0.376)
Second generation -6.390 -10.518 -5.489 -9.529 -5.262 -9.281
(3.258)* (3.604)*** (3.251)* (3.558)*** (2.567)** (2.910)***
Income situation
GDP 0.234 0.131 0.160 0.043 0.023 -0.271
(0.071)*** (0.076)* (0.054)*** (0.064) (0.198) (0.229)
Gini 106.511 54.064 42.443 -1.480
(33.292)*** (45.286) (29.574) (37.165)
GDP*Gini -0.660 -0.343 -0.454 -0.171
(0.183)*** (0.214) (0.132)*** (0.181)
Institutions
Ethnic segregation 21.171 35.415 14.839 13.876 -28.898 -7.532
(12.053)* (14.551)** (14.164) (13.426) (33.067) (37.480)
Social segregation -5.890 16.366 14.943 34.064 34.940 1.579
(19.901) (19.330) (17.921) (19.126)* (47.314) (52.994)
Preprimary enrollment -0.067 -0.166 0.041 -0.020 -0.272 0.096
(0.107) (0.092)* (0.091) (0.090) (0.243) (0.276)
Age primary 5 -8.323 -17.130 -12.279 -24.169
(7.040) (7.017)** (7.781) (7.562)***
Age primary 7 1.463 3.223 10.386 13.134
(5.349) (4.722) (5.968)* (5.366)**
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.604 1.001 -0.088 0.340 -1.197 -0.948
(0.376) (0.492)** (0.329) (0.412) (0.676)* (0.776)
Hours per year -19.383 -17.087 -22.130 -19.865 -21.112 -17.123
(6.294)*** (6.997)** (5.548)*** (5.266)*** (8.290)** (9.703)*
Hours per year sq 0.964 0.904 1.067 1.021 1.013 0.863
(0.309)*** (0.389)** (0.286)*** (0.298)*** (0.442)** (0.525)
External studass -7.134 -17.641 2.533 -7.675 -3.469 -18.633
(9.031) (9.159)* (6.428) (7.456) (18.345) (20.397)
Population density -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.041 -0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.020)** (0.024)
Youth unemployment 0.109 0.051 0.149 0.095 0.803 0.499
(0.280) (0.315) (0.245) (0.256) (0.493) (0.573)
Prom weak math/scie -31.564 -14.193 -25.931 -1.142 -27.241 -7.357
(8.979)*** (7.994)* (9.342)*** (7.527) (14.982)* (17.883)
Prom gifted math/scie 12.379 1.825 12.615 -2.143 32.883 -11.393
(6.365)* (7.647) (5.247)** (6.260) (11.767)*** (16.183)
Constant 80.569 59.255 112.651 92.650 161.271 178.694
(38.541)** (38.394) (35.536)*** (29.957)*** (59.906)*** (71.044)**
F-Statistics
(migration regions) 1.84 3.50 1.18 3.92 0.58 0.39
R2 0.295 0.275 0.356 0.334 0.485 0.460
Adj R2 0.209 0.187 0.277 0.253 0.292 0.257
N 334 334 334 334 334 334
Notes: Weighted least squares, cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (countries), missing dummies and
migration regions included, ***, ** and * indicate a statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%.






Adjusted R2 0.173 0.137
Contribution of Income situation
R2 0.092 0.064





Adjusted R2 0.064 0.038
Contribution of Income situation
R2 0.031 0.073
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.053
N = 190
Notes: Pooled weighted least squares estimations, once with institutions and
once with the income situation as explanatory variables only.
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